not accept samples from private hospitals for h1N1 flu testing. But why was no mechanism found to get her throat swab tested in NIV when her serious condition ruled out transfer to Naidu hospital, which has no facilities to tackle serious patients and has no ventilators? It is questionable whether Rida would have survived if oseltamivir had been started after her admission to Jehangir, a couple of days earlier. This uncertainty arises out of the fact that she had already deteriorated a great deal when h1N1 flu was first suspected. But this does not condone the bungling of throat swab testing.
Public services inadequate but worked anyway
Most of the other h1N1 flu deaths in Pune have also been due to acute respiratory distress syndrome. Some of these patients deteriorated insidiously and did not receive oseltamivir in time. Nobody was geared to face these emergencies in the initial phase of the epidemic. hence one should resist the temptation to blame the concerned personnel without taking into account the complexity of the situation.
The inadequate public health system in Pune was suddenly faced with the huge task of dealing with a rapidly spreading epidemic. The staff was initially overwhelmed but later swung into action. Privatisation ideologues should note that whatever may be the lacunae of public health services, Pune could face this epidemic only because of this system. Whether it's a matter of doing "real time PCR" on hundreds of samples every day (costing at least Rs 10,000 per sample) or screening about a lakh people within a week for h1N1 flu through many centres exclusively doing this work, or the judicious use of the limited stock of oseltamivir, the private sector would not have been able to do all this. Moreover, providing all these services free of charge by the private sector would be out of the question.
Government rigidity and lack of dialogue
This epidemic did expose the weakness of the public health system -its worst failure was due to its rigidity and lack of dialogue with private doctors and the public. Central government guidelines in force when Rida Shekh died had only epidemiological criteria for selecting a person for h1N1 flu testing. Amongst those who had influenza like illness, those who had been abroad during the previous eight days, or had been in close contact with a h1N1 flu case, or those who resided in or had visited a community reporting cases of h1N1 flu, would be throat swab tested for h1N1 flu. They would be given oseltamivir if they were found to be positive. Neither Rida Sheikh nor some others who died of h1N1flu had this history. Many other people got h1N1 flu without this history. But for almost 10 days no clinical criteria were added to these epidemiological criteria.
What is worse, it was not announced that only those who fulfilled these two criteria would be throat swab tested. As a result, thousands of people who thronged to the Naidu hospital and waited for hours together in a long queue were told to go back if they did not fulfil these two criteria. A proper announcement in the media would have spared the people and staff of these unnecessary queues.
After a week, throat swabs were taken only of people who had severe symptoms. But this too was not communicated to the people. As the death toll and cases of h1N1 flu mounted, more and more people with cold, cough and fever thronged to the Pune Municipal Corporation's screening centres, only to be turned away without testing if they did not have severe symptoms.
Once it was established that it was an h1N1 flu epidemic, it was not necessary to test every suspected case of h1N1 flu and oseltamivir could have been given to a certain category of patients without throat swab testing. But the system was inflexible. Finally by August 14, it was announced that it had been decided to put cold, cough and fever cases into three categories based on clinical criteria. Private practitioners could cater to Category A patients. (Those with mild fever plus cough or sore throat with or without body ache, headache, diarrhoea and vomiting are unlikely candidates of h1N1 flu. It was decided that they should be given routine antipyretic treatment and observed for 48 hours.) It was also decided to give oseltamivir to certain patients without doing a throat swab test or without waiting for the report. These revised guidelines should have been published in all newspapers, and space bought for the announcement. This was not done. Only some papers published these revised guidelines verbatim. The Indian Medical Association was given a copy of these guidelines but though there was no way to immediately reach out to all doctors and people except through an announcement in the papers, this was not done.
The Jan Aarogya Abhiyan, Pune, the local outfit of the People's health Movement, through its press release on August 7 (6) and its letter to the district collector on August 11 (7) , demanded that the guidelines be revised and communicated to doctors and the public through an announcement in the papers. But there was no response from the government. The only advertisement that the directorate of health services published was one threatening doctors that their registration would be cancelled if they did not cater to h1N1 flu patients.
No public private partnership
During the first 10 days the private health sector hardly played any role in controlling the epidemic, mainly because there were no guidelines from health officials to private practitioners on how to manage a suspected case of h1N1 flu. Second, private ] doctors reacted to the criticism of Jehangir hospital by sending all patients with cough, cold and fever to Naidu. The government responded with threats but no instructions on how private practitioners were supposed to attend to these patients -when they should refer patients and where.
Later private doctors started attending to h1N1 patients, and some private hospitals agreed to admit patients with acute respiratory distress syndrome in their ICUs, but most private hospitals do not have the capacity to reserve and isolate one ICU for h1N1 patients. The Indian Medical Association offered to send volunteers to schools to talk to students; they also offered to send private practitioners to volunteer for a couple of hours a day at the corporation's screening centres. But they wanted N 95 masks for these doctors and a stock of oseltamivir tablets with the IMA in case some doctors developed symptoms of h1N1 infection. This demand was not met. Experts from private medical colleges have been silent and have played no role. On the whole, the much talked about public private partnership has not materialised.
Conclusions from the Pune epidemic
The electronic media in particular sensationalised the controversy regarding Rida's parents' allegations that Jehangir had been negligent. The media also declared Jehangir to be guilty of negligence without trying to find out what went wrong.
Though Pune could face the epidemic only because of the public health system, this public health system was too slow in changing its guidelines in the face of the realities of the Pune epidemic. It also failed in communicating its strategy to doctors and lay people. This rigidity and lack of dialogue with the people caused a lot of unnecessary anxiety, unnecessary suffering of patients who stood in long queues, and unnecessary strain on doctors and other healthcare staff.
The role and responsibility of private doctors in such situations needs to be clearly laid down.
Can we expect a better performance from health officials and the TV media when there is a similar epidemic in the future?
